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Abstract: 
Recent investigation of sovereign debt negotiations finds that serious debt restructuring typically 
involves multi-period delay. We develop an incomplete information bargaining model to account for 
this, highlighting economic recovery and sustainability considerations as complementary reasons for 
delay. Evidence relating to settlements, along with the policy implications of our analysis, are 
discussed.   
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1. Introduction 
Sovereigns in default are, in practice, faced with a choice between two types of debt 
renegotiation - reprofiling or restructuring. This is the conclusion of a recent extensive study of 
foreign currency debt negotiations by Mariscal et. al. (2015), hereafter MPST. In the 
terminology of IMF (2014), reprofilings are relatively fast, they may be pre-emptive (in the 
sense that they are announced before the country enters default) and frequently have a zero 
'haircut' of principal. Restructurings, on the other hand, do have face value haircuts, have 
deeper reductions of present value and are typically arranged ex post with delay  
What light might bargaining theory throw on why some settlements take longer than others 
and embody greater debt reductions? That is the issue addressed in this paper.   
It is, of course, true that prompt agreement is a key feature of the basic single-creditor, 
complete information bargaining models of sovereign debt restructuring: where preferences 
and the size of the pie to be divided are known, this is what the ‘alternating offers’ approach of 
Rubinstein (1982) delivers. Several reasons for delay have been also been considered in the 
literature, however. Merlo and Wilson (1995), hereafter MW, show that delay may prove 
beneficial when it permits the debtor country's economy- or creditor-country banks - to recover 
from a crisis; and it may act as a signal between participants with asymmetric information, 
Rubinstein (1985). Problems of creditor coordination and issues of creditor heterogeneity have 
also been explored, Pitchford and Wright (2012), Ghosal and Miller (2016); and the role of 
political factors, as in Trebesch (2016). 
In this paper, we present an incomplete information model of debt restructuring with a 
representative private bondholder which incorporates two of these factors: delay occurs along 
the equilibrium path of play driven by both the prospect of uncertain economic recovery and 
as a means of signalling sustainability concerns by the debtor state. The length of delay is 
positively correlated with the size of the haircut:  one-period delay permits economic recovery 
while multi-period delay allows the debtor state to signal the need for a larger ‘haircut’.1 
What this provides is a rationale for the correlation between length of delay and size of write-
down noted by MPST and for which we provide further evidence. We discuss some recent 
                                                 
1 Sullivan (2016) provides experimental evidence that strongly suggests bargaining with asymmetric information drives 
delay in settlements. 
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settlements to illustrate the formal analysis - as well as case studies that limit the scope of its 
application.  
As an appropriate indicator of what restructuring might be needed, the Paris Club adopted 
progress toward the Millennium Development Goals, typically for Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries. More generally, transparency has been identified as one of the basic principles for 
efficient sovereign debt restructuring by the UNCTAD (UN General Assembly, 2015). 
Potentially, the IMF could resolve uncertainty about future growth or sustainability concerns 
where these are in dispute. But its position as senior creditor may limit its ability to play that 
role.  
1.1 Related literature 
The evidence that sovereign bond restructurings involve costly delay is extensive, see for 
example Cruces and Trebesch (2013), Roubini and Setser (2004) and the monograph by 
Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2007). 
In a carefully calibrated model of sovereign default, with debt renegotiation modelled along the 
lines of MW, Bi (2008) finds that delay was beneficial for Argentina as it gave the economy 
breathing-space to recover from deep recession. While multi-period delay can indeed occur in 
this framework, delay length may be negatively correlated with haircut size. 
Asymmetric information as a cause of delay in sovereign debt restructuring is explored in Bai 
and Zhang (2012). In this case, it is the creditor's reservation value that is private information, 
and the debtor government knows only its distribution: delays in reaching agreements arise in 
equilibrium because the debtor uses costly delay to screen the creditors' reservation value.   In 
contrast, in our paper, it is the debtor's type that is private information. For Bai and Zhang, 
moreover, the key fact to be explained is that 'sovereign debt renegotiations take an average 
of five years for bank loans but only one year for bonds' and the explanation advanced is that 
the secondary market for bonds provides information on creditors reservation value. In this 
paper, however, the key stylised fact to be explained is why prolonged delay may occur even 
with bonds. 
How lack of commitment may bedevil negotiations is explored in the comprehensive study by 
Benjamin and Wright (2016), where the rationale for delay in settling is that the creditor's ability 
to share in the future surplus is threatened by the risk that the debtor will default on what is 
agreed. The data-set they examine (and use in quantifying their model) includes bank loans 
as well as bonds; and the data period (since 1970) includes the ‘lost decade’ of the Latin 
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American debt crisis of the 1980s. It has been argued, however, (by MW amongst others) that 
a substantial reason for delay at that time was the risk that prompt write-downs of syndicated 
bank loans would have wiped out the equity of key banks in the US financial system. 
By assuming that debt restructuring involves bargaining with a representative private 
bondholder, we abstract from problems of coordination among multiple private creditors. There 
is an extensive - and growing - literature on this topic, see, for example, Kletzer (2002), Ghosal 
and Miller (2003), Weinschelbaum and Wynne (2005), Pitchford and Wright (2012), Ghosal 
and Thampanishvong (2013), and Ghosal and Miller (2016). As the factors generating multi-
period delay examined in this paper do not require, in an essential way, multiple private 
creditors, such considerations are omitted from the formal model; but the role of specialist hold-
out creditors is discussed in considering the case of Argentina. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple three period 
bargaining model. Section 3 contains a discussion of evidence relating to settlements. Section 
4 considers various policy implications. Section 5 concludes. The Online Appendix contains 
an infinite horizon extension of the three-period incomplete information model studied in 
Section 2.   
2. A model of recovery, sustainability, signalling and delay in bargaining 
 
To highlight the factors on which our analysis is focussed, we first review, in a two-period 
context, the MW logic for delay– postponing a settlement to allow for economic recovery. Then 
we look at a two-period case where there is uncertainty about the type of the debtor. While 
creditor acceptance of sustainability requirements will shift the bargaining position in favour of 
the debtor, when there is asymmetric information about the debtor’s type, we show how this 
may give rise to a signalling equilibrium with delay.  
After these preliminaries, both factors are combined in a stylized three-period model, where 
we find conditions for longer delay, first to allow for economic recovery and then for signalling.  
2.1 Waiting for recovery 
Conditional on default, we assume there is bargaining between debtor and creditor over 
restructuring sovereign debt. Although this restructuring applies to the stock of outstanding 
debt, from a bargaining perspective it is more natural to focus on the associated flow - namely 
the fiscal surplus needed to service, in full and on a sustainable basis, the sovereign debt owed 
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to the creditor2. Suppose, for example, the sovereign debtor uses tax revenue for one of the two 
reasons, either spending on a public good or on servicing debt: then, by seeking a write-down, 
the debtor seeks, effectively, to divert resources from servicing foreign debt to providing 
domestic public goods.  We will denote the total tax revenue available for bargaining as    > 0, 
and refer to it as ‘the pie’ or ‘the bargaining surplus’.  
 
The analysis begins at a point at which the debtor is in default and in a recession, i.e. we 
assume that the value of   at the initial period, immediately after default, is low and is denoted 
by L . However, we allow the future value to be stochastic so that in the following period   can 
continue to be low at L  with probability p   or  grow  to a  higher  level,  H ,  with probability  
1 p , where the probabilities are common knowledge and the growth of   corresponds to an 
increase in the tax revenue. The bargaining model formalizes the argument that in the initial 
period, the current surplus, L , can be shared between debtor or creditor, but doing so means 
giving up on the prospect of economic growth, i.e. this is a primitive endogenous growth model. 
 
Assume, for convenience, that creditor and debtor share a common discount factor 1  .3 If 
no contingent contracts can be written, we find that delay will occur when the expected 
increase in the pie exceeds the interest rate. Although their infinite horizon analysis makes the 
analysis much less straightforward, this is the principal feature of the bargaining equilibria in 
Merlo and Wilson (1998), who cite the delay in restructuring Latin American debt in the 1980s 
as an illustration of their approach.  
 
The bargaining game is specified as follows. The debtor makes the offer in the first period; but 
each party has equal probability of making an offer (being the proposer) in the subsequent 
period. In the second (and final) period, bargaining takes the form of an ultimatum game, where 
the proposer takes all. Breakdown payoffs are zero for both players. (It is assumed that offers 
matching breakdown payoffs will be accepted.) Table 1 illustrates, with the debtor’s payoff first, 
depending on the state of the economy and who makes the offer. 
 
Table 1 Final period payoffs  
                                                 
2 Guzman and Lombardi (2017) provides a clear and persuasive exposition of this perspective.  
3 An assumption that is relaxed when it comes to calibration. 
 6 
 Depression 
(p) 
Recovery 
(1-p) 
Debtor’ s Offer 
(1/2) 
,0L  ,0H  
Creditor’s Offer 
(1/2) 
0, L  0, H  
Note: Probabilities are shown in parentheses  
 
Moving to the first period, we calculate the continuation values which are the same for each 
player, namely 
2
E 
, where (1 )L HE p p     denotes the expected size of the pie.  
 
In the first period, with the debtor as proposer, these continuation values limit the offers that 
can be made. The current pie can be shared between debtor or creditor, but doing so means 
abandoning the prospects for economic growth. Figure 1 shows debtor payoffs – current and 
expected – on the horizontal axis with the creditors’ payoff on the vertical axis.  Pareto-efficient 
settlements lie on the downward-sloping line labelled ‘current pie’, the boundary of the set of 
feasible current settlements. Discounted future prospects, summarized by the continuation 
values, lie on the upward-sloping 45 degree line, a reflection of the ex ante symmetry of 
bargaining power in the second period. These continuation values will lie outside the ‘current 
pie’ if expected growth of the economy, L
L
E
Eg
 


 , exceeds the discount rate, defined as 
1
r



 ; inside, if growth prospects fall short. With high growth prospects, as indicated at G 
for example, delay dominates current settlement and the creditor will reject R, the best the 
debtor can offer while matching its own continuation value. 
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Figure 1 Continuation values and ‘efficient’ delay 
  
With relatively low growth prospects, however, the bargaining model predicts an immediate 
settlement. With continuation values at point L, for example, there is scope for current 
settlement; and the debtor can achieve the payoff of A which improves on continuation.  
 
More formally, we have the following result:   
 
Proposition 1. Efficient delay occurs when Eg r . The creditor’s payoff with efficient 
delay is .
2
E
  
 
Proof. In period 1, the maximum offer the debtor will make is 
2
L
E
   . Hence, it follows that 
whenever 
2 2
L
E E 
    the debtor’s offer will be rejected. Re-writing the preceding 
Creditor 
payoff  
Debtor Payoff 
    
𝜋𝐿 
 
Offers 
rejected 
R 
  
 
 
G   
 
  
 
L   
A   
Continuation 
values 
Creditor rejects current settlement 
 
  
𝜋𝐿 
  
 
  
Current pie  
Higher growth prospects  
B   
Creditor accepts current settlement 
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inequality as 
1
L
L
E
E

  
 
   . Subtracting both sides of the preceding inequality by -1, 
simplifying and using the definitions of r  and Eg   yields the desired result.  ■ 
 
  
Proposition 1 shows that delay is efficient whenever the expected growth of the size of the 
bargaining pie implies that the maximum offer the debtor is willing to make to obtain immediate 
agreement is less than its expected continuation payoff by waiting to settle.  
 
2.2 Signalling concern for sustainability  
 
By allowing information to differ as between creditor and debtor, delay can arise as a costly 
signal by the debtor concerned with sustainability, designed to secure an improvement in 
continuation payoffs. Specifically, we assume the debtor may be one of two types - one 
concerned with sustainability, the other not - where the debtor knows his type but the creditor 
is not sure.   
 
Consistent with the interpretation of the bargaining surplus in Section 2.1 above, we motivate 
a concern for sustainability as follows. The sustainability constraint, 𝑠, represents the minimum 
fraction of the tax revenue required by the sovereign debtor for expenditure on the public good 
consistent with economic and political stability of the debtor country. For simplicity of analysis, 
we will assume that there are just two debtor types: Optimistic and Cautious. When 𝑠 is close 
to 0, the debtor is Optimistic (with a lower sustainability constraint and willing to tolerate more 
austerity), while when s is close to a level 𝑠  >  0, the debtor is Cautious (with a higher 
sustainability constraint and less willing to tolerate austerity). At the start of the debt 
restructuring process there is incomplete information about the debtor’s sustainability 
constraint. We assume that the debtor is better informed than the creditor about its own 
sustainability constraint.    
 
Concern for sustainability can be captured by distinguishing debtor types in the utility they get 
from consuming their part of a ‘pie’ of size  . We assume utility is linear in (equal to) the payoff 
only for payoffs greater than or equal to {0, }s s : for the Optimistic debtor 0s   while for the 
Cautious debtor 0s s  . Let , , ,i i O C   denote the share of the surplus obtained by each 
type. For the Optimistic debtor  OOu   for any allocation, but for the Cautious debtor 𝑢𝐶  =
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𝜋𝐶 - 𝑠 only if   C s  ; for any share strictly less than s , 0Cu  . The implication is that the 
Cautious Debtor will not accept an offer below s as the payoff to each agent is zero if 
bargaining breaks down.  
 
The debtor knows his type, the creditor does not, but believes that the debtor is Optimistic with 
probability 0q .   
 
The debtor makes the initial offer in the first period; but each party has equal probability of 
making an offer in the subsequent period. Breakdown payoffs are zero for both players in 
period two.  
 
We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in mixed and pure strategies that involve delay4.   
 
We begin with the ultimatum game in the final period, when the belief of the creditor that the 
debtor is an Optimist has evolved and is denoted 1q . Consider the creditor’s offers at extreme 
values of 1q . As indicated in Table 2a, the offer is zero unless the debtor is thought to be 
concerned about sustainability; in which case it is s .  
 
Table 2a Creditor’s offers with extreme beliefs 
Creditor’s Belief 
as to Debtor’s type 
Creditor’s offer to Debtor Payoff for Creditor 
1 1q   (it’s an Optimist) 0   
1 0q   (it’s not) s   s   
 
 
For less extreme beliefs, 10 1q  , the creditor’s expected payoff from a high offer (of s ), 
acceptable to either type, will be  s   ; but the expected payoff from a low offer (of zero) , 
acceptable only to the Optimist, will be 1q . If 1q s   , the creditor will do better by making 
                                                 
4 In what follows, we demonstrate the existence of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in mixed strategies in which the two 
debtor types choose different mixed actions in the first period and hence, signal their types to the uninformed creditor. In 
CEPR DP 117710 (Ghosal et al., 2016) we show how, once inside options are present in our model, a pure strategy Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium exists where the two debtor types choose different pure actions in the first period to signal their 
types to the uninformed creditor.   
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a low offer, and conversely for 1q s   . When 1
s
q



 , the two offers have the same 
expected payoff.  
 
To summarize, the creditor’s offers are shown as a function of his priors in Table 2b.  
 
Table 2b Creditor’s offers in the ultimatum game for all values of beliefs  
 
Creditor’s Belief 
as to Debtor’s type 
Creditor’s offer to Debtor Payoff for Creditor 
1
s
q




 
(it’s probably an 
Optimist) 
0   
1
s
q




 
(it’s probably Cautious) 
s   s   
 
 
As for the debtor, his offer to the creditor is simply zero - which will be accepted by the creditor 
in this ultimatum game.  
 
From the perspective of the initial period, bearing in mind that each player has a 50% 
probability of making the next offer, the expected discounted payoffs as a function of the prior 
are as in Table 3: 
 
Table 3 Continuation values in the initial period of bargaining   
 
Creditor’s Belief 
as to Debtor’s type 
Expected payoff for 
debtor (for both types) 
Expected Payoff for creditor  
1
s
q




 
(it’s probably an 
Optimist) 
2

 1
2
q
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1
s
q




 
(it’s probably Cautious) 
( )
2
 s 
 
( )
2
 s 
 
 
Assume that the debtor makes the offer in the initial period.  
 
The following proposition demonstrates the existence of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with 
delay. It shows that, for some parametric configurations, delay arises from both debtor and 
creditor choosing mixed strategies, with the debtor able to signal, to the uninformed creditor, 
its sustainability constraint.    
 
Proposition 2. Suppose 0
s
q



 , { , }L H   . Then a mixed strategy Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium exists where delay occurs with probability  01 q
s
 
  
 
 along the equilibrium 
path of play. Suppose 0
s
q



 , { , }L H   . Then a pure strategy Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium exists where delay occurs with probability one. The creditor’s expected 
payoff is 
 
2
E s


.  
 
Proof. Our initial focus is on separating equilibria in mixed strategies. Note that for the creditor 
to randomize at t=2, it must be the case that 
1 .
s
q


 


 


 Note that the debtor makes the offer 
at the initial period denoted by 1 1( , )x x  . Suppose that 
 
1
2
s
x
  
 
 
 

 ; then, by computation, 
   
1
2
.
2 2 2
ss
x
   

 
  
  
  



    
 Let 1'x  positive number such that
 
1' .
2
s
x
 

 
 
 
 

   
Suppose the Optimistic debtor offers 1 1( , )x x   with a probability  1   and offers 1 1( ' , ' )x x   
with a probability  , while the Cautious debtor offers 1 1( ' , ' )x x   with a probability 1. The 
posterior belief of the creditor at 2t  , which is 1
s
q



 , must be consistent with the Bayesian 
updating rule so that  0
1
0 0
,
(1 )
q
q
q
s
q


 


 



 and therefore, by computation, 
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* 0
0
1
0
qs
qs

 
  
    
  
.  Since we must have that * 1  , it follows that the model 
parameters must satisfy the condition 0
0
0
1
1
qs s
q
qs
 

   
    
  
.  Moreover, if the creditor 
observes the offer 1 1( ' , ' )x x  , the creditor believes with probability one that the debtor is an 
Optimist. Finally, we specify the posterior beliefs of the creditor in subgames that do not occur 
along the equilibrium path of play as 1 0q   if the current offer of the debtor, 1 1( '' , '' )x x  is such 
that 11( '' )x x   with 1 1q  if the current offer of the debtor, 1 1( '' , '' )x x  is such that 11( '' )x x . 
Given these beliefs, the creditor will accept the offer 1 1( , )x x   but reject the offer 1 1( ' , ' ).x x   
Clearly, given the preceding computations, both debtor types are choosing a best-response 
and given the debtor's strategy, the creditor cannot do better either. Hence, delay occurs with 
probability  *0 0 0(1 ) 1q q q
s


 
     
 
 along the equilibrium path of play. When 0
s
q



 , 
then, in equilibrium, at 1t   both debtor types offer 1 1( ' , ' )x x  with probability one. Posterior 
beliefs are specified so that 1 0q   if the current offer of the debtor, 1 1( '' , '' )x x  is such that 
11( '' )x x   with 1 0q q if the current offer of the debtor, 1 1( '' , '' )x x  is such that 11( '' )x x . 
Hence, the offer is rejected by the creditor. There is no signalling along the equilibrium path of 
play so that 0 1q q but nevertheless, delay occurs with probability one along the equilibrium 
path of play. ■ 
 
When the creditor attaches a high (prior) probability to the debtor being Optimistic, there is no 
pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with delay; it is, however, possible to construct a 
mixed strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with delay where the debtor signals its type (the 
value of the sustainability constraint). Along the equilibrium path of play, the probability of delay 
decreases (and in the limit, goes to zero), the higher the (prior) probability that the debtor is 
Cautious. When the creditor attaches a high (prior) probability to the debtor being Cautious, 
then there is a pure strategy equilibrium with delay; as both debtor types want to delay, delay 
occurs with probability one along the equilibrium path of play but there is no signalling of debtor 
type.    
 
So much for the technical detail of equilibrium with delay; for an intuitive understanding, 
consider the behaviour of the assorted players, starting with the Cautious debtor.  
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Assume the creditor’s prior beliefs are such that, without signalling, he is unwilling to grant a 
substantial write down in the second round of bargaining. For the Cautious debtor, who seeks 
to gain a substantial write-down by using delay as a signal, the plan is simple - make an offer 
that will be refused. For the creditor, however, things are not so simple. Only when the 
creditor’s posterior beliefs attach a high enough5, probability that the debtor is Cautious that 
he decides to grant a debt write down. As these beliefs evolve in Bayesian fashion along the 
equilibrium path of play, the mixed strategy of the Optimist here plays a crucial role. With some 
probability he is tempted to join Cautious in delay. What is this probability? Just enough so that 
the creditor will come to believe (with a probability just high enough) that he is dealing with a 
Cautious creditor so that it is optimal to grant a write down!  With the residual probability, the 
Optimist makes an offer sufficient for prompt settlement6. So, everyone plays their part in 
achieving probabilistic delay, with Cautious signalling all the time, Optimist sometimes blocking 
the signal but sometimes joining in; and the creditor providing relief only where (posterior) 
beliefs warrant it.  
 
This is how the players behave along the equilibrium path where delay can occur. Out of 
equilibrium, however, the creditor’s beliefs must be configured around a threshold value (the 
Optimist’s offer specified above) such that neither debtor type has an incentive to deviate from 
what we have just described in the preceding paragraph.  
 
 Suppose, next, that the creditor’s prior belief is such that the debtor is Cautious with a 
probability high enough to make it willing to grant a write down in the second round of 
bargaining even without any signalling. Then both debtor types will want to make an offer that 
leads to delay and a generous write-down (both debtor types act identically). Here, again, we 
must specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs so that neither debtor type has an incentive to deviate.  
 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that, where the sustainability condition is common knowledge, this 
shifts bargaining power in favour of the Cautious debtor without any need for signalling. This 
reallocation does not, however, affect the MW condition given in Section 2.1 for delay where 
there is uncertainty as to the growth of the pie.   
 
                                                 
5 I.e. 1
s
q



 . 
6 For the Optimist to be willing to randomize between the two offers, it must be the case that prompt settlement and delay 
generate the same expected payoffs.  
 14 
2.3 The three-period model 
 
This section shows how recovery and sustainability can each contribute to delay bargaining. 
By extending the bargaining model by an extra period, we find that extended delay can occur, 
first due to prospects of recovery and second due to signalling of sustainability concern. 
Therefore, prolonged delay is associated with a larger haircut in the debt swap. 
 
In the three-period case, the timing of moves and events is as follows7: 
 
Table 4 The three-period game 
 
 Size of Pie  Proposer Outcome 
t = 1 
L    
 
debtor makes offer  
 
if offer accepted, game ends; 
 if offer rejected, game continues, 
and conditional on , nature 
chooses 
  is { , }L H  with prob. ,1p p ; 
s is {0, }s with prob. 0 0,1q q . 
 
t = 2:   
L  or H  
 
debtor makes offer     
     
if offer accepted game ends; 
if offer rejected, game continues to 
final period (with no intervention 
by nature) 
t= 3 
L  or H   
 
with probability ½ 
debtor makes offer     
with probability ½ 
creditor makes offer     
if offer accepted game ends; 
if there is no agreement,  
there are disagreement payoffs of 
(0,0).  
 
The following proposition characterizes the conditions under which two-period delay occurs in 
the three-period bargaining model:   
 
                                                 
7 The sequence of moves in the stylized three-period model has the debtor making the offer at the first two-time periods. In 
the online appendix we consider an infinite horizon version of the bargaining game where, after the first round of bargaining, 
at each period both the debtor and the creditor make an offer with equal probability. The main results of the three-period 
model studied in the main text continue to hold in the infinite horizon bargaining model.       
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Proposition 3 Two-period delay exists whenever 
1
r Eg


 
  
 
. The creditor’s expected 
payoff with two period delay is 
 
2
2
E s


. 
Proof. In any subgame starting at 2t  , the analysis of the preceding section applies and, for 
brevity, isn’t repeated. Note that at a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the anticipated discounted 
expected payoffs in each subgame for the creditor and the debtor are, respectively, 
 
2
s  
 
 



 
and 
 
2
s  
 
 



, { , }L H   . Hence, at 1t  , it follows that the creditor’s continuation payoff 
from rejecting the debtor’s current offer is defined as: 
 
 
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2 2 2
L H
E ss s
a p p
 
   
      
         
      
 . It follows that whenever 
 2
2 1
L
E s
a r Eg
  


  
     
 
, two-period delay occurs along the equilibrium path of 
play. ■ 
 
The above proposition demonstrates the conditions under which, in the three-period game, 
multi-period delay occurs, along the equilibrium path of play, initially driven by the prospect of 
uncertain economic recovery followed by an additional period of delay due to signalling of 
sustainability concerns by the debtor. Intuitively, to obtain two-period delay along the 
equilibrium path of play, the maximum offer the debtor is willing to secure immediate 
agreement with the creditor must be less than the continuation payoff it expects to obtain in 
the subgame with one further period delay.  As 1
1


 
 
 
, it is evident that the condition 
required for two-period delay is more stringent than the condition for one-period delay derived 
in Section 2.1 above. 
 
A key empirical implication of our formal analysis is that prolonged delay is positively correlated 
with a larger haircut (corresponding to lower creditor payoff) in all the models formally analysed 
in this section. Moreover, in the three-period model, with two-period delay, the creditor’s 
expected payoff is less than its payoff both in the model studied in Section 2.1 (where one 
period delay is driven by the prospect of (uncertain) recovery) and in the model studied in 
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Section 2.2 (where one period delay is driven by incomplete information about the debtor’s 
sustainability constraint). In the following section, we examine empirical evidence consistent 
with our formal analysis and as well as case studies that limit the scope of its application.  
 
3. Evidence of haircuts  
 
In this section, we first report on salient features of the MPST data-set which runs  for four 
decades after 1970. We then report summary  details  of  sovereign debt restructurings 
between 1998 and 2005 to see in broad terms the correlation between write-downs and 
delay.   
 
As MPST note, the distribution of haircuts in forty years of sovereign debt renegotiations is 
bi-modal. Using data from Cruces and Trebesch (2011), including all renegotiations with 
foreign banks and bondholders between 1970 and 2010, the histogram they provide has 
peaks at haircuts of about 25% and 85%, as shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Figure 2 Distribution of haircuts.  
Source: Mariscal et al. (2015, p.17) 
 
For bonds only, however, haircuts are smaller. When they ‘filter the debt renegotiations taking 
out those that are donor-funded (typically the HIPIC renegotiations) and those that are bank 
debt renegotiations then the distribution becomes smoother. Now taking this subset of bond 
renegotiations and considering the two types (those with and those without face value 
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haircuts), we find that the average haircut of the former is some 50 percent while the average 
haircut of the latter is some 15 percent’. MPST (p.7) 
 
For bonded debt, Table 5 illustrates the broad correlation between delay and haircuts. It also 
indicates the heterogeneity of outcomes when sovereigns seek to restructure their debts.  
 
 
Table 5 Sovereign debt restructurings with haircuts until 2005 
 
Sovereign 
State 
Restructuring 
Negotiations 
 
Default? 
‘Delay’ 
- after default 
Face 
Value,  
$billion 
 
Haircut 
Bonds and 
Bank Loans 
    
 
18 countries 
 
08/1982-5/1994 
  
141 months 
   
 30-35% 
Bonds  
only  
 
     
 
Argentina 
9/2003-4/2005 
19 months 
Yes 
12/2001 
 
40 months 
 
$79.7 
 
67% 
 
Russia 
11/1998-7/2000 
20 months 
Yes 
1/1999 
 
18 months 
 
$29.1 
 
69% 
 
Ecuador 
8/1999-8/2000 
12 months 
 
Yes 
 
12 months 
 
$6.5 
 
60% 
 
Ukraine 
1/2000-4/2000 
3 months 
 
Yes 
 
3 months 
 
$2.6 
 
40% 
 
Pakistan 
2/1999-12/1999 
10 months 
 
No 
 
- 
 
$0.6 
 
30% 
 
Uruguay 
4/2003-5/2003 
1 month 
 
No 
 
- 
 
$3.8 
 
26% 
Sources: Table 14 and 15 in Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2005)8; Table A.3 in Roubini 
and Setser (2004); Table 1 in Bi (2008)  
 
                                                 
8 The losses that defaults have inflicted on creditors are largely based on the comparison between the (remaining) payment 
stream that was originally promised to investors and the payment stream associated with the restructured instruments, both 
discounted at a common interest (Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer, 2007). 
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To highlight the contrast between bank loans and bonds when it comes to restructuring, earlier 
experience reported by Bi (2008) for sovereigns that restructured bank debt as well as bonds 
is briefly summarized in the top row.  The average delay of more than eleven years shown 
there includes the ‘lost decade’ of Latin American growth, where US banks had to accumulate 
substantial reserves before writing-down around a third of their loans under the Brady Plan, as 
discussed by Cline (1995) and Merlo and Wilson (1998).  
 
The sovereign debt restructurings shown in rest of the table, ordered by length of delay after 
default (if formal default was declared), indicate the positive correlation of delay and write-
down. While the average haircut is about 50%, those with above average haircuts (Russia, 
Argentina, and Ecuador) took the longest to resolve - suggestive evidence that negotiating a 
bigger haircut involves longer delay.  
 
In his investigation of ‘efficient delay’ Bi (2008) argues that the entire delay of 40 months shown 
for Argentina can be accounted for in terms of ‘waiting for recovery’ as in MW.  We would 
argue, however, that, following default in 2001, there were two separate phases leading up to 
the debt swap in 2005. First, from the beginning of 2002 to mid-2003, the Argentine economy 
was recovering strongly from deep recession and there appeared to be a consensus between 
debtor and creditors to await recovery (a consensus reinforced by the political difficulties faced 
by the regime in power pending presidential elections).  As for the second phase, one could 
interpret the meagre offer made by Argentina in September 2003 as driven by sustainability 
concerns. (In terms of our analysis, see Figure 2, this low offer was designed to be rejected - 
leading to further delay and a reappraisal of the debtor's type - and to a debt exchange in 2005 
that acknowledged these sustainability concerns.  
 
Developments after those in Table 5, however, indicate two limitations of our model - namely 
the absence of creditor heterogeneity and of third party official intervention. In fact, holdout 
creditors played a played a key role in explaining further delay – and the final out-turn - for 
Argentina. As the debt exchange achieved in 2005 involved only 76% of the bonds in default, 
negotiations continued, leading to a second exchange in 2010, raising creditor participation to 
93%. The Republic of Argentina effectively treated the second swap as a defeat for the 
holdouts, and made it clear that the remaining 7% would not receive any payment. But the 
remaining holdouts included specialist funds9 determined not to accept any write-down: and, 
as the debtor appeared to be challenging the authority of the US court handling the case, they 
                                                 
9 Often referred to as vulture funds. 
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were able to secure an injunction to prevent the payment of coupons on the bonds already 
exchanged unless the claims of the holdouts were also paid as claimed. Since this so-called 
‘Pari Passu’ injunction threatened to undermine all that had been achieved in earlier 
restructuring, the Republic of Argentina - after election of a new administration - finally agreed 
to a settlement with the principal holdouts in early 2016, Guzman (2016). So, our formal 
analysis can account for part but not all the spectacular delay involved in this complicated 
case.  
 
In the case of the 2012 Greek debt restructuring, private creditors settled without default, 
accepting a write-down of 69% on debt with face value of $199b, achieved after only 8 months 
of negotiation. But this was orchestrated largely by third party official creditors, highlighting the 
institutional differences between debt problems of a member of a currency union and those of 
stand-alone nation states. The Eurozone may be incomplete - a currency union without fiscal 
and banking union - but policy-makers of the so-called Troika (the Commission, the ECB and 
the IMF) were determined it should not fail (Zettelmeyer et al., 2013; Sapir et al., 2015). This 
hardly fits the scenario analyzed in our model of a private creditor and a debtor state involved 
in bargaining with asymmetric information with no third party intervention. 
 
4. Some policy implications 
 
In terms of the analysis provided earlier, sustainability concerns may be signalled by delay; 
but this will only happen if the benefits to the debtor are sufficient to cover the cost of delay. 
The fact that MPST have uncovered - that there are so many repeat ‘reprofilings’ - suggests 
that the costs of using delay as a signal may be substantial.   
 
If delay is too costly, is there an alternative? The Greek case delivered a prompt restructuring; 
but it hardly provides a tempting template. By way of institutional reform, the experience of the 
Paris Club provides a more promising precedent. Initially, as Sachs (1995) pointed out, when 
negotiations were seen simply in terms of debt enforcement, this led to debt reductions which 
failed to give countries a ‘fresh start’: so, the same debtor countries frequently reappeared 
seeking further concessions. A key alternative, that Sachs (2002) discussed, was to use the 
Millennium Development Goals as a benchmark: so, a restructuring would be judged 
inadequate if it failed to help the debtor make progress with these goals. The paper by Cheng 
et al. (2016) takes a 60-year view of the operations of the Paris Club and, as the title suggests, 
charts a significant shift before and after 1980 - a shift ‘from debt collector to relief provider’; 
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and attempts to measure the success of this change of focus - in terms of achieving economic 
growth in particular.  
 
The sovereign debtors involved in the Paris Club negotiations are typically10 Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC), however. What of countries with middle or higher incomes? How to 
signal appropriate restructuring criteria for them? When Argentina went into default at the end 
of 2001, Anne Krueger took the bull by the horns by advocating a form of sovereign bankruptcy 
procedure, analogous to what domestic bankruptcy law provides for corporations and 
municipalities. Her proposal, Krueger (2002), gave a central role to the IMF, which would 
naturally have a data available on the country11 and its problems (and has unparalleled 
experience of providing support – with conditions - to countries in financial trouble). The 
proposal was not adopted, however, largely because the US Treasury was not convinced: a 
key issue being that the IMF would face a conflict of interest as both judge and creditor.  
 
While the IMF could potentially resolve uncertainty about future growth or sustainability 
concerns when these are in dispute, this same conflict of interest may preclude it from acting 
in this role. Consider a simple extension of the model studied above which differentiates 
between an official senior creditor (such as the IMF) and private bondholders, whose claims 
are subordinate. Assume that bargaining surplus over which the debtor and the private 
bondholder bargain over,  , is the residual amount available after any payments to IMF are 
made. As a senior creditor, the IMF’s claim on resources will reduce the bargaining surplus   
available. Since this will exaggerate the significance of debtor's sustainability constraint s  over 
which the private bondholder and the debtor can bargain, this will tend to make delay more 
likely. Hence, given its senior creditor status, the IMF may not be able to play the role of 
disinterested assessor who can reduce delay.   
 
The US Treasury’s alternative to institutional reform was renegotiable contracts - specifically 
Collective Action Clauses in sovereign debt instruments so that a supermajority of creditors 
could, after default, engineer debt restructuring as they judged appropriate. The apparent 
success of the contractual approach has encouraged further proposals.  Thus Brooke et al. 
(2013), a paper from economists at the Bank of Canada and Bank of England, makes the case 
for ‘sovereign CoCos’ (Contingent Convertible debt instruments) to ease liquidity crises, where 
the provision of emergency funding by the IMF would trigger a rollover by private bondholders. 
                                                 
10 According to the Paris Club, although selected non-HIPC countries are also entitled for assistance under the Evian 
approach, there is lack of detail on exactly which countries are covered. 
11 Blustein (2005) discusses official sustainability assessments of Argentina made by the IMF but kept confidential. 
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For issues of solvency, the authors advocate the issuance of GDP linked bonds12. State-
contingent contracts, as advocated by Robert Shiller, have been positively assessed in a study 
by Barr et al. (2014) at the Bank of England; and similar ‘growth-linked securities’ have been 
strongly endorsed by Blanchard et al. (2016), who emphasize how they could assist European 
countries in handling the current sovereign debt overhang.13 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Apart from Greece, recent sovereign debt restructuring involving considerable delay secured 
substantial haircuts. We develop a bargaining model to account for this. With a stochastic 
bargaining surplus and asymmetric information about the debtor's sustainability concern, we 
show that multi-period delay can occur, initially to allow for recovery then for signaling concern 
about sustainability; so prolonged delay is positively correlated with a large haircut. These are 
by no means the only factors to be considered, however, as recent experience in Argentina 
and Greece has shown.  Possible institutional development, problems of creditor coordination 
and prospects for contractual innovation are further issues in sovereign debt restructuring all 
clearly worth exploring.  
 
So too is the role of domestic politics. In the ‘war of attrition’ model developed by Alesina and 
Drazen (1991), for example, different social groups adopt an ‘après vous Alphonse’ approach 
as they attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto others, following a fiscal crisis. More 
recently, Trebesch (2016) has provided a wealth of empirical evidence on domestic political 
factors associated with delay in restructuring. Political conflict may be another symptom of 
domestic concern for achieving a sustainable settlement. Our results on signalling by delay 
are, we believe, complementary to such studies.  
 
In the absence of an institutional solution for overseeing debt restructuring for higher income 
countries, contract redesign offers an alternative: Brooke et. al. (2013), for example, make a 
case for adopting sovereign CoCos and GDP-indexed bonds ex ante to help align the debtor’s 
commitments with its capacity to pay. Extending the formal analysis developed here to discuss 
sovereign CoCos is a topic of future research. 
 
 
                                                 
12 GDP-linked warrants were issued by both Argentina and Greece: but this was ex post, and the contracts suffered from a 
marked novelty premium, estimated at 800 bps. 
13 See Williamson (2017) for further discussion.  
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